David Drew

Results: 124



#Item
61Decision theory / Quantal response equilibrium / Bargaining / Nash equilibrium / David K. Levine / Drew Fudenberg / Self-confirming equilibrium / Solution concept / Subgame perfect equilibrium / Game theory / Economics / Problem solving

Is Behavioral Economics Doomed? The ordinary versus the extraordinary1 Max Weber Lecture June 8, 2009 David K. Levine2

Add to Reading List

Source URL: www.dklevine.com

Language: English - Date: 2009-06-24 13:21:07
62Ethics / Behavior / Decision theory / Social psychology / Actuarial science / Behavioral economics / Expected utility hypothesis / Allais paradox / Self control / Utility / Economics / Behavioral finance

Self Control, Risk Aversion, and the Allais Paradox Drew Fudenberg* and David K. Levine** First Version: May 12, 2006 This Version: February 5, 2010 This paper develops a dual-self model that is compatible with modern dy

Add to Reading List

Source URL: www.dklevine.com

Language: English - Date: 2010-02-05 05:29:47
63Nash equilibrium / Outcome / Best response / Normal-form game / Repeated game / Strategy / Bayesian game / Risk dominance / Game theory / Problem solving / Extensive-form game

When is Reputation Bad?1 Jeffrey Ely Drew Fudenberg David K. Levine2 First Version: April 22, 2002 This Version: November 20, 2005

Add to Reading List

Source URL: www.dklevine.com

Language: English - Date: 2005-11-21 14:01:27
64Self-confirming equilibrium / Nash equilibrium / Bayesian game / Extensive-form game / Strategy / Solution concept / Strategic dominance / Best response / The Intuitive Criterion / Game theory / Problem solving / Economics

Learning to Play Bayesian Games1 Eddie Dekel, Drew Fudenberg and David K. Levine2 First draft: December 23, 1996 Current revision: July 22, 2002 Abstract

Add to Reading List

Source URL: www.dklevine.com

Language: English - Date: 2003-11-04 12:28:39
65Nash equilibrium / Subgame / Strategy / Information set / Bayesian game / Game theory / Extensive-form game / Solution concept

Superstition and Rational Learning1 Drew Fudenberg and David K. Levine2 This version: [removed]First version: [removed]Abstract: We argue that some but not all superstitions can persist when learning is rational and players

Add to Reading List

Source URL: www.dklevine.com

Language: English - Date: 2005-07-18 17:35:40
66Science / Drew Fudenberg / Self-confirming equilibrium / David K. Levine / Fictitious play / Nash equilibrium / Solution concept / Trembling hand perfect equilibrium / Best response / Game theory / Problem solving / Economics

An Economist’s Perspective on Multi-Agent Learning by Drew Fudenberg and David K. Levine October 5, 2006 In their wide-ranging and provocative discussion, Shoham, Powers and Grenager (SPG) survey several large literatu

Add to Reading List

Source URL: www.dklevine.com

Language: English - Date: 2006-10-05 10:44:53
67Economics / David K. Levine / Nash equilibrium / David Hirshleifer / Drew Fudenberg / Minimax / Best response / Reputation / Repeated game / Game theory / Problem solving / Mathematics

UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA Los Angeles ESSAYS ON REPUTATION A dissertation submitted in partial satisfaction of the

Add to Reading List

Source URL: levine.sscnet.ucla.edu

Language: English - Date: 2001-07-07 10:59:50
68Nash equilibrium / Extensive-form game / Centipede game / Solution concept / Outcome / Strategy / Determinacy / Normal-form game / Best response / Game theory / Problem solving / Self-confirming equilibrium

MEASURING PLAYERS’ LOSSES IN EXPERIMENTAL GAMES* Drew Fudenberg and David K. Levine October 7, 1996

Add to Reading List

Source URL: www.dklevine.com

Language: English - Date: 1996-12-07 20:22:50
69Outcome / Strategy / Normal-form game / Repeated game / Risk dominance / Game theory / Problem solving / Nash equilibrium

Continuous Time Limits of Repeated Games with Imperfect Public Monitoring1 Drew Fudenberg and David K. Levine2 This version: [removed]First version: [removed]

Add to Reading List

Source URL: www.dklevine.com

Language: English - Date: 2007-05-29 08:07:41
70Generating functions / Normal distribution / Berry–Esseen theorem / Integration by substitution / Central limit theorem / Moment-generating function / Probability theory / Mathematical analysis / Statistics

A Large Deviation Theorem for Triangular Arrays Drew Fudenberg and David K. Levine1 Departments of Economics, Harvard University and Washington University in St. Louis First Version: November 1, 2007

Add to Reading List

Source URL: www.dklevine.com

Language: English - Date: 2007-12-13 13:39:35
UPDATE